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 JANE C. GINSBURG
 Copyright Without Walls?:
 Speculations on Literary Property
 in the Library of the Future
 Introduction
 THIS ESSAY CONSIDERS THE application and adaptation of copy-
 right law to the library of the future. ' In this "library without walls," works will be
 accessible by computer to users near and far. While a printed book usually is read
 by only one person at a time, that same book in digital format may be simulta-
 neously consulted by as many users as have PCs linked by modem to the library.
 Where collecting quotations from printed sources today requires transcription or
 photocopying, in the library of the future it may be possible to download and
 print out excerpts, or even the entire work, through the user's personal computer.
 All of these uses involve reproductions or transmissions of the accessed
 works. Unless the works are in the public domain, these uses, if unauthorized,
 may be copyright infringements-at least under today's doctrines. Are literary
 property rights as we have known them inimical to a networked environment?
 Or can there be copyright without walls? If copyright requires "walls," what will
 replace it, and will the replacement prove more satisfactory to libraries and their
 users? Although some librarians have lamented the restrictive effects of copy-
 right, and perceived overreaching applications by publishers,2 a world without
 copyright may prove even less user-friendly. The reason is simple: in such a
 world, the information supplier, relying on contract, forgoes the benefits of the
 copyright law, but also evades important limitations on the copyright monopoly,
 notably the fair use privilege. In such a world, librarian-users might look back on
 existing copyright law with wistful nostalgia.
 To project the future of copyright in the library of tomorrow, it will be helpful
 first to set the stage by briefly reviewing the role of copyright in the operations of
 the library of today. In the library of tomorrow the past will long remain present:
 copyright issues are posed when the library scans printed documents and distrib-
 utes them in digital format. I will therefore consider copyright issues that arise in
 the transition from hard copy to digital media.
 The second part of this essay will posit an information world of tomorrow in
 which all documents are available from the outset in digital format-indeed,
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 some of them may be available only in that format. In this context, a variety of
 copyright questions presents itself to tomorrow's librarians. Some of these issues
 concern the library as a conduit for information originating elsewhere: How will
 the library obtain access to these documents, particularly if it is not a national
 deposit library? On what basis can the library make this access available to users?
 More broadly, does copyright have any remaining role in a digital environment
 in which information suppliers impose contractual conditions on access to works?
 Other issues derive from the library's role as a generator of information, such
 as catalogs and summaries of documents both within and outside the library's
 own holdings. In this context, predictions of copyright's infirmity may well prove
 premature. The library may both create its own copyrighted works and infringe
 others'. The library may be a copyright proprietor of the bibliographic database
 if it extends even a modicum of creativity to its selection or organization of the
 information. But if its database substantially reproduces works contained in the
 catalog, the library may also be infringing literary property rights in the refer-
 enced works.
 Copyright
 and the Hard-copy Library
 Copyright and the library of the recent past. Until the advent of the photo-
 copier, a library's activities rarely, if ever, implicated copyright considerations. A
 library circulated books and other documents; it did not copy them. Copyright
 comprises the exclusive-incorporeal-rights to reproduce and publicly perform
 or transmit works;3 it does not reach the physical object that embodies the work.
 Thus, once the copyright owner sold a copy of the work, that copy-in its physical
 manifestation-became the personal property of its new owner, who could resell,
 lend, or otherwise dispose of her chattel.4 So long as the library simply rotated
 possession of the book, the library remained fully within its rights as a property
 owner.5 Library patrons might, of course, manually copy or type out portions of
 the book for personal use, but these limited reproductions would have fallen
 within the "fair use" and "fair dealing" exemptions of U.S. and Commonwealth
 law, or under explicit private copying privileges found in continental copyright
 legislation.6
 Once libraries began to avail themselves of the photocopier, however, they
 could no longer neglect copyright considerations. Photocopying could be used to
 preserve books and to fill gaps in collections when original formats were no
 longer available. Beyond these functions, photocopying could increase the
 library's ability to service users by multiplying the number of available copies or
 parts of copies. But once copies are being made, copyright issues are posed.7
 To evaluate the severity of the copyright challenge, it is necessary to sketch
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 the contours of the U.S. "fair use" privilege, and its foreign-law analogs. Most, if
 not all, copyright laws afford certain exemptions from the author's or copyright
 owner's rights. One of the most widespread exceptions excuses copying that does
 not substitute for sale or licensing of the work.8 In the U.S. "fair use" exception,
 the question of potential economic harm caused by copying is central, but the
 broader public-interest issue of access to knowledge weighs heavily in the balance
 as well, especially when the reproduction is made for nonprofit educational pur-
 poses.9 In addition, in the 1976 Copyright Act Congress set forth special highly
 detailed rules under which libraries could engage in unauthorized copying.'0
 These rules generally exempt archival copying" but would not permit a library
 to substitute photocopies for regular acquisitions.'2
 The U.S. Copyright Act also details circumstances in which libraries may
 make copies of works or portions of works for users for their private study or
 scholarship.'3 Because the statute circumscribes the instances in which libraries
 may supply copies of documents to patrons, an important copyright issue con-
 cerns the provision of photocopies to persons outside the scholarly and nonprofit
 communities. Many libraries, particularly legal, medical, and scientific libraries,
 have clients who pay for the library's services. If these clients are not nonprofit
 institutions, any "fair use" claim is likely to be questionable. These clients may be
 able to save time and money by using a library to deliver documents; however,
 there is no reason they should be able to save additional money at the expense of
 the copyright holder. '4 In these instances, libraries charge and remit royalties to
 the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a consortium of publishers that collec-
 tively licenses its repertory of works to various users, including university
 libraries. The collective licensing mechanism permits the library to copy any and
 all of the licensed works, without having to obtain separate permissions each time
 a copy is made.'5 If the copyright owner of the client-requested work is not a
 member of the CCC and has no other licensing program with the library, the
 library is supposed to seek permission to copy each work each time an outside
 request is made. Not surprisingly, this can be a burdensome process.
 Organizations for the collective licensing of photocopy rights exist in many
 other countries as well. In some countries, collective licensing resembles the
 activities of the CCC: libraries may remit the monies, but the fees are actually
 paid by the libraries' users. In others, however, the government may negotiate
 with the collectives to pay a sum covering all photocopying in educational insti-
 tutions, thus covering nonprofit end users, such as students and teachers, as
 well. 16
 Scanning the role of copyright in the transition to digital libraries. Many libraries are
 converting portions of their print collections to digital format. At the time they
 acquired the works they now intend to scan, the libraries may not have negotiated
 digital conversion rights. If the works thus to be converted are still protected by
 copyright, in what instances must permission to digitize be secured?
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 Putting the work into digital format is only the beginning, from both a copy-
 right holder's and a user's point of view. Once the work has been converted, it
 can be accessed in several ways. It can be viewed on-screen, it can be printed out,
 and it can be downloaded. Under copyright law, all of these constitute reproduc-
 tions.'7 Which, if any, modes of access might be considered "fair use" or benefit
 from another copyright exception? Analysis will require analogizing digital access
 to the kinds of reproductions that qualified for exemptions in the hard-copy
 world. Applying the rules of yesterday's library to regulate use of technologies
 that will radically transform tomorrow's library might seem like trying to use a
 phonograph designed for wax cylinders to play a CD. Nonetheless, this analysis
 may at least help identify those areas in which current copyright rules may
 require reshaping.
 Conversion to digital format. Converting a hard-copy work to computer-
 readable form entails reproducing the work. If the work is scanned, it is first
 reproduced as an "image file," containing an electronic picture of the pages. If
 that file is then converted to ASCII form,'8 the resulting "text file" constitutes the
 creation of another reproduction. Because the copyright owner normally enjoys
 the exclusive right to reproduce the work, must the library therefore secure per-
 mission to perform the conversions? I would anticipate that, at least in the U.S.,
 rules that today afford libraries exemptions for archival photocopying also apply
 to optical scanning and text-file creation for the same purposes. If the library is
 permitted to make the copy, it should not matter what technology was employed
 to generate the reproduction.'9
 Making the file available to reader-viewers raises a different problem. For a
 printed text, reading presents no copyright issues because copyright does not
 attach to the physical object. In the digital world, however, looking at the text
 does implicate copyright, because viewing the text on-screen entails making a
 reproduction of the text.20 The question therefore arises whether the digital
 equivalent of "looking at a book" requires the copyright owner's permission. I
 suspect that, although this act of viewing is analytically prima facie copyright
 infringement, were the issue to be litigated a court would excuse the copying as
 fair use. Although the work's format is different, the library is providing the same
 service of making the work available to users. A policy favoring easy and inex-
 pensive public access to works of authorship underlies the fair use exemption.2'
 A court may therefore be unlikely to look sympathetically on a copyright holder's
 attempt to impose a pay-per-view requirement simply to access the work when
 no permanent copies are made.
 The preceding discussion has addressed the access question as if the library
 would treat the digital copy like a hard copy, making it available only to one user
 at a time. In fact, however, digital copies, unlike hard copies, can be made avail-
 able simultaneously to as many users as a network or online service permit. Estab-
 lishment of a digital copy therefore can lead to a multiplication of user copies.
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 Creation of text files in order to multiply the number of copies in the library's
 collection would also, at least under today's rules, fall outside the free-copying
 boundary.22 The practical effect of converting a text from hard copy to digital is
 the creation of digital copies in addition to-or in lieu of-hard copies; accord-
 ingly, unless it determined to forgo one of the signal benefits of digital tech-
 nology-multiplicity of access-the library will have to confront the copyright
 consequences of multiple reproductions. Thus, copyright considerations neces-
 sarily influence a library's disposal of its digital files, even if no copyright was
 infringed when the file was initially established.
 For example, suppose the library wished to preserve its copy of a work still
 protected by copyright, such as Herbert Howell's 1942 treatise on copyright law,23
 which we will assume was printed on acid paper and is slowly but surely burning
 itself up. We will further assume that the book is out of print, and unavailable at
 a reasonable price from other sources. In the U.S., these facts would entitle the
 library to convert the book to digital format. They would also permit the library
 to make the digital copy available to one user at a time. But they would not entitle
 the library to make the digital copy available to many users at a time. That kind
 of reproduction would require the authorization of the copyright holder.
 By the same token, suppose that the library had multiple copies of certain
 high-demand, in-print books, such as Allan Farnsworth's treatise on contract law,
 and that the library wished to save shelf space by substituting digital copies for all
 but one hard copy. The first question is whether the library may establish the
 initial digital file without the copyright owner's permission. Because this work is
 currently available, the library cannot avail itself of an archival copying exception;
 it would, therefore, probably need permission to digitize in the first place.
 How many copies may the library simultaneously generate from the Farns-
 worth digital file? Arguably, the library should be able, without permission, to
 create as many digital copies as it had hard copies. But this argument is weak;
 after all, if a library had four copies of a commercially available text, and loses
 three because borrowers fail to return them, the library is not entitled to free
 photocopies to restock its inventory.24 Moreover, the library's privileges "extend
 to the isolated and unrelated reproduction. . . of a single copy"; they do not cover
 "concerted reproduction" of "multiple copies of the same material, whether made
 on one occasion or over a period of time."25 Systematic substitution of digital for
 hard copies of particular works seems more like "concerted" than "isolated and
 unrelated" reproductions. As a practical matter, however, this question may not
 arise in this fashion: once the library must negotiate with the copyright owner to
 engage in the initial digitalization, it should also negotiate the number of copies,
 and the further reproductions that users make from them.
 Copying from the digital copy. Let us assume that we are starting from a text file
 that the library created either within the bounds of the library's free-copying or
 fair use privileges, or with permission from the copyright owner. We already
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 know that making that file available to more than one user at a time means repro-
 ducing the work in a manner exceeding the traditional library prerogatives. The
 copyright owner will therefore assert legal control over the amount of and
 manner of access to the work. Similarly, the copyright owner will wish to regulate
 any further reproductions that libraries or users might make by printouts or
 downloading. Indeed, the owner might demand compensation for certain repro-
 ductions that would otherwise qualify for an exemption under the library copying
 or fair use provisions. Because the U.S. Copyright Act explicitly permits contrac-
 tual override of the library copying privileges,26 it is foreseeable that, once the
 library is required to negotiate with the copyright owner in order to obtain per-
 mission to digitize at all, or to make more than one simultaneous copy, the copy-
 right owner will endeavor to impose a host of additional conditions on access to
 and further reproduction of the work.27
 On the other hand, if the library enjoyed a privilege initially to digitize the
 work and it restricts availability to one user at a time, the copyright owner would
 have no claim to demand additional compensation unless any further reproduc-
 tions made by the library or its users exceeded the statutory exemptions. It is
 important to consider the application of these exemptions in the digital environ-
 ment. This examination requires not only transposing the copying media from
 photocopying to printouts and downloading, but also evaluating whether the
 transposition leads to results inconsistent with the policies underlying the current
 rules.
 Reproductions that currently qualify for exemption under U.S. law include
 a user's printing out or downloading short excerpts for private study or
 scholarship28 and a library's provision of a copy of even an entire work to a user
 for private study or scholarship when an original is no longer available at a
 fair price.29 However, in the second case, one might anticipate that the library
 should make such a reproduction available only in hard copy. A digital copy too
 easily lends itself to further reproduction, thereby undermining the reprint or
 reissue markets for the work and exceeding international norms of exempted
 reproductions.30
 For the same reason, in those countries that permit free "private copying" of
 entire works, the exemption should be tailored to exclude private copying by
 means of downloading. Even if the further digital copy is made for purely private
 purposes, the medium so enhances the copy's potential to be fruitful and multiply
 that temptation is best avoided. Similarly, the provision of the U.S. copyright law
 that exempts a library from liability for copies made by patrons if the copies were
 produced on equipment made available, but unsupervised by, the library,
 requires rethinking.3' While the exemption might continue to apply for user-
 accessible printers attached to workstations, the library should be liable if, without
 the copyright owner's permission, it makes equipment available to users that
 enables them to download entire files.32
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 Interlibrary loan practices afford a further illustration of the potential incom-
 patibility of the current library copying exemptions and the electronic environ-
 ment. The U.S. Copyright Act permits libraries to "participate in interlibrary
 arrangements that do not have, as their purpose or effect, that the library or
 archives receiving such copies or phonorecords for distribution does so in such
 aggregate quantities as to substitute for a subscription to or purchase of such
 work."33 Sending digital copies on interlibrary loan could achieve precisely that
 effect-because once a library acquired a digital copy, absent further limitations,
 the library would no longer require hard copies (or publisher-authorized digital
 copies). Were digital-format works to be made available through interlibrary loan,
 the originating library should at least accompany any freestanding digital version,
 such as a floppy disk, with limitations as to the number of users and the kinds of
 further reproductions. Similar limitations should apply to copies sent via elec-
 tronic mail. Alternatively, the originating library could restrict the requesting
 library to online access from the originating library while denying permission to
 download; authorized downloading would be subject to the requesting library's
 agreement to destroy the copy.
 Several of the accommodations just proposed have in common the attempt
 to respond to the transition to "libraries without walls" by erecting walls wherever
 possible. Thus, in a model in which hard-copy copyright concepts continue to
 dominate, fair use will remain shaped by the model of the printed book. That
 means, for example, that the law imposes a wall between the first, free, digital
 onscreen copy and the subsequent multiple copies that can be viewed simulta-
 neously. The law maintains walls between documents and users by obliging
 libraries to limit user access to onscreen views or short printouts, because access
 by downloading too easily lends itself to generation of uncontrollable user copies.
 These accommodations, and the concepts underlying them, will require fur-
 ther evaluation and adjustment in the library of tomorrow in which the docu-
 ments originate from publishers in digital form.34
 Copyright and Contract
 in the Digital Library
 Copyright law has supplied protection to authors who could not oth-
 erwise control the exploitation of their works. It has traditionally presumed a
 world in which, but for copyright, unauthorized reproductions would be perva-
 sive and unremediable. As Justice Holmes observed, "In copyright, property has
 reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude is not directed to an
 object in possession or owned, but is now in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the
 spontaneity of men where, but for it, there would be nothing of any kind to
 hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from
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 persons or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand
 miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong."35
 In the library of the future, these assumptions may no longer apply. Today, I
 will not know if a library user in Berkeley, in Boston, in Bonn, or in Brisbane is
 photocopying this article.36 But tomorrow, when "we are all connected," and this
 article is available worldwide online, I will have the means to know who is reading
 the article onscreen, and who is downloading or printing out excerpts or com-
 plete copies. Here, as elsewhere, knowledge is power: I (or my digital publisher)
 can condition online access to my article on compliance with whatever restrictions
 I wish to impose.
 Libraries as conduits for digital information: acquisitions and restrictions on use. In
 imagining a world in which most new works will be available in digital format,
 and in which many will be available only in digital format, I have suggested that
 one question is whether copyright retains any relevance. Another question is
 whether libraries retain any relevance. After all, if users may obtain the infor-
 mation by logging onto the publisher, or onto a third-party information provider
 such as Dialog or Prodigy, what use does a library serve? The user need no longer
 go to a place where works are gathered; assembly of works from many sources
 will be accomplished by modem. The library itself will be an electronic phenom-
 enon, affording digital access to its own and to others' collections of works. Why
 should an information provider resort to the conduit of a library, when it can
 connect directly to the user? If the provider nonetheless gives libraries access to
 its information, how will the provider control the information so that the library
 does not displace the provider's customers?37
 From the publisher's perspective, libraries may still afford valuable publicity
 for their works, and may reduce the transactions costs of dealing with individual
 users. Libraries may also become the repositories of digital files whose commer-
 cial value has ebbed; although library acquisitions of current material may pose
 conflicts with a publisher's program of dissemination, libraries may become store-
 houses of older works whose retention would be burdensome for the publisher,
 but which still have importance for scholars. From the user's perspective, tomor-
 row's library may resemble a full-service "help line"; the librarian of tomorrow
 will assist users in understanding and navigating the myriad available databases
 and other digital sources.
 If digital publishers determine that it remains worthwhile to give libraries
 access to their works, they will almost certainly seek to condition that access upon
 compliance with a variety of restrictions. Publishers may wish to prevent certain
 kinds or quantities of user reproductions, or to charge for all uses over single
 viewings of the document. Publishers could enforce these limitations directly if
 the library is simply providing the user with a computer connection to the pub-
 lisher. Publishers then could themselves limit initial access (onscreen viewing) to
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 certain categories of users; they could prescribe a maximum number of bytes to
 be reproduced by printing out or downloading; or they could completely prohibit
 downloading.
 Digital documents that are distributed in freestanding format, such as CD-
 ROMs, may prove more susceptible to unlicensed copying than online sources.
 Once the document leaves the producer's control, the producer cannot know
 firsthand who is viewing, who is copying, and how many copies are being made.
 Nonetheless, technology affords the producer a variety of extra-copyright pro-
 tections. For example, the library would not be permitted to make the CD-ROM
 directly accessible to users, but would be obliged to make it available through the
 library's local-area network (LAN). Such a network would respond to individual
 user-access codes, enabling the library either to screen out or to charge more for
 certain kinds of users identified by the publisher. The LAN could be pro-
 grammed to limit or prohibit printing or downloading. Moreover, both CD-
 ROMs and online services could be "booby-trapped" to prevent unauthorized
 printing out or downloading, for example, by flashing warnings that the user's
 request may not be fulfilled; by "freezing" if the user attempts to make a further
 copy; or even by sending a virus to the user's disk if the user persists.
 Contracting out offair use. Some of the limitations sought by digital publishers
 might override rights of libraries and users under fair use and library copying
 privileges, even after these privileges have been adjusted to account for the
 greater potential of digital copies to supersede or compromise the publisher's
 market. The U.S. Copyright Act provides that the library's privileges in no way
 affect "any contractual obligations assumed at any time by the library or archives
 when it obtained a copy or phonorecord of a work in its collections."38 It seems
 clear, therefore, that the policies underlying these exceptions to copyright pro-
 tection are not violated if the library agrees to forgo its privileges.
 The same provision of the U.S. Copyright Act also states that the library's
 special statutory privileges in no way affect "the right of fair use,"39 and the leg-
 islative report accompanying the 1976 Act indicates that the special privileges
 accorded to libraries give them greater leeway to copy than they would enjoy by
 application of fair use alone.40 Fair use in effect affords libraries and users some
 kind of free-copying "safety net." One should inquire, therefore, whether a
 library's agreement with a publisher to forgo whatever free-copying privilege
 might be available under fair use is permissible under the copyright law.
 In addressing this question, one might first inquire why copyright law is at
 issue at all. In the world here posited, the publishers abandon copyright and seek
 to regulate all use by contract, on the premise that where copyright's protections
 have nothing more to offer them than do contract and technological controls,
 copyright taken together with its exceptions, particularly fair use, offers them
 less. In pressing a contract claim, the publisher is seeking to achieve copyright-
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 like protection, unencumbered by copyright's countervailing limitations. Do the
 Copyright Act and the federal policies underlying it permit enforcement under
 state contract law of what one might call the publisher's re-edition of copyright?
 This question calls for application and analysis of federal preemption doc-
 trine. The Copyright Act precludes state law claims when the subject matter to
 be protected is copyrightable, and when the rights asserted are equivalent to
 exclusive rights under copyright.4' Since what the publisher purveys almost
 always constitutes "original works of authorship,"42 the first prong of the preemp-
 tion test will usually be met. The right asserted by the publisher is the right to
 prevent copying; this appears equivalent to the exclusive right under copyright
 to reproduce the work in copies.43 However, substantial authority supports the
 proposition that rights under contract are not equivalent to rights under copy-
 right. The nonequivalence derives from the difference between a contract and a
 property-right claim. A contract binds only those who are parties to it. A property
 right, such as a copyright, is good "against the world"; it is not based on any
 relationship between the party having the right and the party allegedly infringing
 the right. Hence Justice Holmes's statement that copyright "is a prohibition of
 conduct remote from persons or tangibles of the party having the right." A prop-
 erty right confers something in the nature of a monopoly in its object; a contract
 right governs relationships between persons, it does not regulate things.
 Thus, in cases in which plaintiffs have invoked contracts granting them pro-
 tection unavailable under copyright, courts have rejected preemption challenges.
 As one court stated: "A party by contract may agree to pay for ideas, even though
 such ideas could not be protected by copyright law. Rights under such an agree-
 ment are qualitatively different from copyright claims, and their recognition cre-
 ates no monopoly in the ideas involved."44
 Judicial enforcement of contracts barring one party from copying the other's
 ideas is particularly noteworthy, because the federal determination not to protect
 ideas under copyright is very clear. The Copyright Act explicitly provides "in no
 case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
 idea."45 One might argue that this implies that no legal protection should be avail-
 able, whatever the source.46 By upholding contracts that confer greater rights
 than copyright affords, these cases necessarily reject that proposition. As a gen-
 eral matter, moreover, U.S. intellectual property preemption decisions do not
 sustain the objection that limitations inherent to a formal intellectual property
 regime cannot be avoided by resort to a state law doctrine that dispenses with
 those constraints, at least when other constraints accompany the state law protec-
 tion. The Supreme Court has, accordingly, declined to find state trade secret laws
 preempted by federal patent laws, even when they bear on the same subject
 matter.47 While patent protection is of short duration (seventeen years), and
 requires the patent holder to disclose the invention, a trade secret lasts as long as
 it remains a secret and, by definition, carries no requirement of disclosure.
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 Though patent laws demonstrate a strong public policy in favor of making the
 invention available and understandable so that others may build on it, trade
 secrets advance none of those goals.
 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that neither did trade secrets conflict
 with those goals, because trade secret protection was far more fragile than patent
 protection. Unlike patents, trade secrets do not protect against independent gen-
 eration of the invention or against reverse engineering. In essence, trade secrets
 govern relations between the trade secret proprietor and those persons, such as
 employees, that she permits, in confidence, to learn the secret. Most trade secret
 cases concern a breach of that confidential relationship.48 Trade secrets thus offer
 an illustration of the successful resistance of a state law information right to fed-
 eral intellectual property preemption. What saves the state law right appears to
 be its contractual (and therefore relatively weak) nature, even though one must
 acknowledge that the party advancing the contract would endeavor to push that
 contract right as close to a property right as possible.
 But what if the premise underlying the nonpreemption cases proved false?
 In the digital environment posited here, contract protection may not be the
 fragile creature presumed in prior intellectual property preemption decisions. If
 access to works could be obtained only through the information provider (directly
 or through an authorized online distributor), and if copying could be electroni-
 cally tracked or prevented, no "third parties" to the contract would exist. When
 "we're all connected," no functional difference may exist between a contract and
 a property right. At that point, it becomes necessary to consider whether limita-
 tions incorporated in the copyright law should be imported to its contractual sub-
 stitute. With respect to libraries and their users, one should inquire whether some
 kind of fair use exception is appropriate. This might take the form of a judge-
 made right of "fair breach," or legislatively imposed mandatory library-user
 rights.49
 Such exceptions could be appropriate if they salvaged important copyright
 policies that would otherwise be frustrated in the move from copyright to con-
 tract. But the policies underlying fair use can be variously described, and not all
 characterizations conflict with the contract regime here imagined. Under one
 approach, fair use is a response to market failure: when the copyright owner
 cannot efficiently license the kind of copying in which the defendant is engaged,
 the use may proceed unlicensed.50 If, by contrast, there exist "reasonably priced,
 administratively tolerable licensing procedures,"''5 no gap exists for fair use to fill,
 and there is no need for the exemption. The contractual regime discussed here
 is consistent with this characterization, because the publisher can charge for every
 kind of use, and the electronic media can keep track of it all.
 Nevertheless, fair use can also be described as an exception to the copyright
 owner's prerogatives, or even as a subsidy from the copyright owner, in favor of
 uses that benefit the public. This interpretation emphasizes the constitutional
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 purpose of copyright to "promote the progress of science (knowledge)." If, in
 certain instances, the law upheld the copyright owner's refusal to license the kind
 of copying in which a defendant seeks to engage, we would be permitting copy-
 right to hinder rather than promote the progress of knowledge.52 The progress
 of knowledge would be impeded because a defendant would have incorporated
 copied material into a new endeavor, such as a work of criticism or scholarship,
 that would have contributed to public enlightenment.53
 That the "public benefit" rationale for fair use would mandate grafting a fair
 use exception onto our imagined contract regime is not clear. This rationale has
 traditionally focused on "productive use" of the copied material in the creation
 of new works, for which copying from old works may be necessary; it does not
 necessarily supply a justification for "intrinsic" copying-copying of a work to
 make "ordinary" use of it.54 Yet under the 1976 Act, libraries have enjoyed some
 degree of fair use copying, even though that copying would seem to be for
 "intrinsic" purposes. Library copying remains consistent with the public benefit
 rationale, if one contends that access to the works is either the predicate for a
 subsequent productive use of them, or, more abstractly, promotes the progress
 of knowledge, because researchers will be enriched by what they read.55
 A role for "fair use breach" or mandatory user rights could be imagined if
 publishers imposed conditions on libraries that denied meaningful access to their
 works. More likely, however, publishers will not deny such access; they will want
 to charge for it in ways they did not charge, and could not have charged, in the
 hard-copy world. Today, the effect of declaring a use "fair" is to make it free of
 charge. Perhaps in a digital world, fair use would not be an all-or-nothing matter;
 a court might uphold the copying at issue, but require the copyist to pay for it.
 The price the user would pay would be less than the price the information-
 provider would have charged. In effect, a compulsory license regime might split
 the difference between user claims to free access and publisher initiatives to
 charge for all uses.56
 But a compulsory license would be justified only if the publisher's rates were
 "unreasonable" according to criteria yet to be articulated. In the digital world, it
 remains to be examined if publishers will in fact make libraries pay "too much"
 for any access to documents. In a digital world, libraries could avoid the sunk
 costs of building and maintaining a paper collection. Online subscription would
 have to cost more on a yearly basis than hard-copy libraries cost, before the price-
 gouging objection would be borne out. Digital publishers might make libraries
 pay for simultaneous access beyond the first user, but this may still cost less than
 investing in additional hard copies. Moreover, competition among digital pub-
 lishers should keep prices down. A more reasonable fear may be rooted in
 monopoly concerns: no competition exists because some publishers are the sole
 source of certain documents; these publishers, if unhappy in their negotiations
 with libraries, will someday pull the plug on the online system. In the hard-copy
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 world, the library always is in possession of the books; in the digital world, if the
 online publishers cut the supply, the library is left with inert workstations.
 This examination has shown that digital media, by enabling publishers to
 keep track of all the uses being made of their works, also give publishers the
 opportunity to charge for all uses, including those that would have been free in
 a hard-copy world. One may therefore fear that publishers will be sorely tempted
 to "overcharge" for access to and copying of their works, especially if there is no
 longer a fair use doctrine to hold them in check. However, we do not now know
 whether, even accounting for new publisher charges, digital media will also
 enable libraries to save money overall. Let us assume that library savings do not
 offset publisher increases when contract replaces copyright regulation of library
 acquisition and use of digital works. A need may nonetheless exist to impose a
 fair use exception or other means of price control. If so, the law regulating book-
 sellers will have come full circle from the 1710 English Statute of Anne, the pre-
 cursor to our copyright law. While that statute was the first copyright act, it was
 not limited to granting authors exclusive literary property rights. Knowing that
 copyright-vested authors would assign their rights to printers and booksellers
 (antecedents of modern publishers), and suspicious of the booksellers, the
 English Parliament included a mechanism for review and reduction of book
 prices. Should books be sold "at such a Price or Rate as shall be Conceived by any
 Person or Persons to be High and Unreasonable," that person could complain to
 a variety of authorities who were empowered to summon the publisher "to
 Examine and Enquire of the reason of the Dearness and Inhauncement of the
 Price or Value of such Book or Books." If the price were deemed unreasonable,
 the inquiring official enjoyed "full Power and Authority to Reform and Redress
 the same, and to Limit and Settle the Price of every such Printed Book and Books,
 from time to time, according to the best of their Judgments, and as to them shall
 seem Just and Reasonable."57 However, the history of this provision of the Act of
 Anne does not bode well for price regulation: the section was repealed because it
 proved unenforceable.58
 Libraries as information generators. Finally, one should address the copyright
 role of libraries as originators of digital information. Digital libraries will compile
 online or disk-stored catalogs of their own and perhaps others' holdings. These
 catalogs may also include search programs to help users identify sources they seek
 from the mass of digital data. Having compiled the catalog or devised the search
 program, the library may be the holder of copyright in an "original work of
 authorship." The copyright laws would protect the library's exploitation of these
 works. However, if the catalog includes substantial portions of the listed works,
 the library may also be infringing third parties' copyrights.
 Copyright in library catalogs. A catalog is a "compilation"; it is "formed by the
 collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
 coordinated, or arranged."59 If the selection, coordination, or arrangement man-
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 ifests a minimal degree of creativity, the catalog will be copyrightable.60 The
 U.S. Supreme Court recently denied copyright protection to a white-pages tele-
 phone directory.6' While the copyright threshold was very low, the Court believed
 that the phone book failed to meet it: its creation entailed no selection (the book
 listed all telephone subscribers in the locality), and no originality of arrange-
 ment (alphabetical). How would a library's digital catalog fare under the Court's
 analysis?
 The selection criterion may not favor the library, at least not if the catalog
 covers the library's entire collection. While valuable for researchers, comprehen-
 siveness may be counterproductive to asserting a copyright. Even so, if the catalog
 satisfies the arrangement criterion, that alone would support a copyright. The
 arrangement may be standard to the genre; for example, books might be
 retrieved according to author, title, or subject listings. Nonetheless, if the catalog
 includes some nonstandard features, it might manifest sufficient selection or
 arrangement of information to be considered minimally "original." These fea-
 tures might include atypical combinations of listings,62 or supplemental infor-
 mation, such as bibliographic references concerning some (but not all) other
 libraries' collections, or online services.
 If the catalog is "original," copyright would protect it against unauthorized
 copying, but only to the extent that "original" material is copied. Thus, at least
 under current U.S. copyright law, downloading all the listings would infringe,
 but extracting standard information would not.63
 Copyright infringement by libraries of works referenced in the catalogs and search pro-
 grams. Imagine the following online catalog of a library's collection:
 Level 1: Author, title, and subject listings
 Level 2: Publisher-prepared abstract(s) of the chosen work(s)
 Level 3: Excerpts from the chosen work(s), displayed in response to search terms selected
 by the researcher
 Level 4: Full text of the chosen work(s)
 This kind of catalog could be a very effective research tool, but portions of it also
 implicate rights in the referenced works. Level 1 does not raise a copyright issue,
 because this information is basic and involves minimal, if any, copying from the
 work. Level 2 is unlikely to offend the copyright laws, because the abstract con-
 tains the bare information necessary to identify the major ideas of the work.64 As
 such, either it is an uncopyrightable collection of "ideas," or copying it would be
 considered de minimis.
 Level 3 becomes more troublesome, because the excerpts may be substantial.
 If so, they pose a prima facie case of infringement, which might be overcome by
 a fair use defense. Similarly, including full-text works might constitute either
 infringement or fair use. In both cases, the catalog and its search program, as
 imagined, would make it possible for the user to call up onscreen all or substantial
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 parts of the digital work. If the catalog and search program do no more, these
 acts seem analogous to simply reading a hard-copy book and should not implicate
 copyright interests in the work viewed. However, if it is also possible for many
 users at one time to access the work in whole or in part, then the catalog is gen-
 erating multiple copies of the referenced work, and this may exceed fair use
 bounds. By the same token, a "level 5" that enabled users to download the works
 would provoke copyright conflicts, although one that permitted printouts of
 excerpts might not.
 In many instances, the library's catalog will not be able to act independently
 of the laws covering the works it lists. The catalog might be viewed as a search
 tool that interacts with text files. But if the text files originate from a digital pub-
 lisher, the library's agreement with the publisher will govern incorporation of the
 works in the catalog. Copyright in the listed works remains an issue for digital
 works generated by the library (for example, by scanning its hard-copy collection)
 and for which the library did not previously obtain permission to make these
 kinds of reproductions.
 Conclusion
 Legal analysis of copyright or contract rights in the library of
 tomorrow depends heavily on conditions that one can try to predict today, but
 that are likely to prove quite different tomorrow. Extrapolating from today's laws,
 and experiences in the transition to digital media, affords some guidance, but
 also highlights the shortcomings of analyses grounded in past presumptions
 derived from the capacities of print media. Existing copyright may be inadequate
 for the "library without walls." But substituting a contract regime may become far
 too burdensome, at least from the library's perspective. If the copyright doctrine
 of fair use survives the rise of contract in the digital world, it must be a different
 kind of fair use, one consciously adapted to the expanded capacities of digital
 communications. But its contours-never precise, even in the hard-copy world-
 cannot be articulated without a clearer picture of the kinds of contracts and com-
 munications the library of tomorrow will call into being.
 Notes
 Many thanks to Jim Hoover, Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Columbia Univer-
 sity School of Law, and to Paul Smith, Columbia University School of Law, Class of
 1993.
 1. Although this essay primarily concerns U.S. copyright law, I will endeavor to point
 out parallels or contrasts with general principles of other Western copyright systems.
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 In addition, although the law governing the relationship of copyright and libraries in
 the U.S. is rather detailed and technical, I will attempt to avoid entanglement in the
 minutiae of our domestic regime. This essay therefore should not be considered a
 primer on copyright and libraries in the U.S. For a fuller and more precise treatment
 of that topic, see, e.g., Randall Coyne, "Rights of Reproduction and the Provision of
 Library Services," Arkansas Little Rock Law Journal 13 (1991):485; Laurie C. Tepper,
 "Copyright Law and Library Photocopying: An Historical Survey," Law Library Journal
 84 (1992):341
 2. E.g., generally, Anne Okerson, "With Feathers: Effects of Copyright and Ownership
 on Scholarly Publishing," College and Research Libraries 52 (1991): 425-40; Nancy Mar-
 shall, "Copyright and the Scholarly Community: The Library's Responsibility to Guar-
 antee User's Rights," Paper delivered at the Fifth U.S.-Japan Conference on Libraries
 and Information Sciences in Higher Education, October 1992. See also Steven Gilbert
 and Peter Lyman, "Intellectual Property in the Information Age," Change 21 (1989):
 22-30: "If higher education cannot effectively deal with these issues, vendors and
 funders will be less receptive to doing business with. . . colleges and universities."
 3. See 17 U.S.C. ? 106 (1988) (rights under copyright).
 4. See 17 U.S.C. ?? 109(a), 202 (1988) (distinguishing ownership of incorporeal copy-
 right from ownership of the physical object).
 5. In some countries, however, the owner is compensated each time a book is lent from
 a library to a user. Such a system is commonly called the "public lending right" (PLR),
 and, as of 1988, was in place in twelve countries. Jennifer M. Schneck, "Closing the
 Book on the Public Lending Right," New York University Law Review 63 (1988): 878,
 880-81 and n. 29. All but Germany have enacted the PLR as a regime separate from
 the country's copyright system (ibid., 897). In the U.K., the purpose of such differ-
 entiation is based on the notion that PLR is merely a payment to the author for a
 "service" rendered; Brigid Brophy, A Guide to the Public Lending Right (Aldeshot, Eng.,
 1983), 53. Others have suggested a less objective purpose: that a country adopting the
 PLR and incorporating it into the copyright regime would have to recompense foreign
 authors under the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions. See Schneck, "Closing
 the Book," 898.
 6. For U.S. law see, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (Boston,
 1987), ? 10.2.2.1 (a noncommercial, nonprofit activity "would support a presumption
 that the use is fair"). For U.K. law see, e.g., E. P. Skone James et al., Copinger and Skone
 James on Copyright, 12th ed. (London, 1980), ? 513 (need for fair dealing arises only
 after a substantial portion of the work has been taken). For French law, see France,
 Code of Intellectual Property, art. 122-25, 2o (permitting copying for private use).
 7. For a helpful general review, see generally Tepper, "Copyright Law and Library
 Photocopying."
 8. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9.2,
 September 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter Berne Convention): "It shall be a
 matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such
 works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with
 a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
 interests of the author."
 9. See 17 U.S.C. ? 107 (1988), setting forth four factors that courts shall take into
 account: "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
 commercial nature, or is not nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
 copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
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 the copyright work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
 for or value of the copyrighted work." The Supreme Court has stated that the fourth
 factor (economic harm) "is undoubtedly the single most important factor," Harper &
 Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). Compare Meeropol v. Nizer, 417
 F.Supp. 1201, 1205-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 560 F.2nd 1061 (2nd
 Cir. 1977): "Courts in recent years have come to recognize that there are occasionally
 situations in which the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return must
 occasionally be subordinated to the greater public interest in the development of arts,
 science, and industry."
 10. See 17 U.S.C. ? 108 (1988).
 11. By "archival copying," I mean copying to preserve a document from degradation or
 destruction, when a replacement is not available. See 17 U.S.C. ? 108(c).
 12. For example, ? 108(d) and (e) of the 1976 Copyright Act authorize copying for inter-
 library loan, but only so long as the copy goes to the user; the requesting library may
 not retain the copy.
 13. See 17 U.S.C. ? 108(d) and (e). Section 108(f)(1) of the Act also exempts libraries from
 liability for copies made by patrons engaged in "unsupervised use of reproducing
 equipment located on [library] premises," without limitation as to the patrons' pur-
 poses for making the copies.
 Under many foreign copyright laws, the kind of copying ? 108(f)(1) addresses
 would most likely be considered "private copying," and therefore exempt. By contrast,
 copies made by third parties, even for the user's private enjoyment, might not qualify
 for the private copying exemption. See, e.g., Cass. civ. Ire, Decision of 7 March 1984,
 1985 (Juris-Classeur Periodique) II 20351, note R. Plaisant (Fr.) ["affaire Rannou-
 Graphie"] (for private copying exemption to apply, the user must make the copies).
 The World Intellectual Property Organization has proposed permitting certain kinds
 of library provision of reproductions to patrons, but only if no collective licensing
 arrangement is available for the territory concerned. The WIPO proposal would
 permit libraries to make free copies for purposes of replacement or conservation. See
 WIPO, Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention for the
 Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, ? 88(a) and (b), reprinted in Copyright 28
 (1992): March, 70-7 1.
 14. Particularly when they can pass along the copying costs to their own clients, see Amer-
 ican Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 26 n. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
 15. On the CCC and its work with university libraries, see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, "Repro-
 duction of Protected Works for University Research or Teaching,"Journal of the Copy-
 right Society 39 (1992): 181, 208-11, 216 and works cited therein. See also Tepper,
 "Copyright Law and Library Photocopying," 357-58, and Coyne, 485, n. 5, and 499-
 50 (discussing role of CCC in photocopying liability cases). Compare William Patry,
 The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law (Washington, D.C., 1985), 320-32 (discussing
 library photocopying and fair use in light of legislative history of ? 108).
 16. On collective licensing societies in other countries, see Stanley Besen and Sheila N.
 Kirby, Compensating Creators of Intellectual Property: Collectives That Collect (Santa Monica,
 Calif., 1989); Stanley Besen et al., "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives,"
 Virginia Law Review 78 (1992): 383, 388, n. 23, and 408, n. 95; Gunnar Karnell, "The
 Legal Situation Concerning Reprography in the Nordic Countries," International
 Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 15 (1984): 685; Jon Rudolph, "Licensing,
 Collecting, and Clearing for Reprographic Rights," Copyright 23 (1987): 148.
 17. A printout is a traditional form of reproduction. Storage on a disk or in the computer's
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 fixed memory is also a reproduction, even though the copy is not directly perceptible.
 Viewing the work onscreen requires storage of the work in the computer's volatile
 memory. Although the work will be erased from that memory once the machine is
 turned off, both U.S. and European Community copyright law have determined that
 the temporary storage nonetheless constitutes a reproduction. See, e.g., the 1978
 Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) final
 report, "The Input Issue," excerpted in Alan Latman, Robert A. Gorman, and Jane
 C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties, 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, Va., 1989), 166-68,
 concluding that inputting into a computer's random, erasable memory, constitutes a
 reproduction. CONTU's recommendations were codified in 1980 at 17 U.S.C. ?? 101,
 117 (1988). See also European Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer
 Programs, 91/250 1991 O.J. (L 122), art. 4(a) (hereinafter EC Directive). "Restricted
 acts" include inputting.
 18. ASCII stands for "American Standard Code for Information Interpretation," and is
 the most unadorned machine readable text form, consisting only of characters
 without formatting information (such as "bold face" or "underline"). ASCII files can
 be transferred between machines operating on incompatible formats, such as IBM
 and Macintosh.
 19. Arguably, the library should be entitled to make a free copy only of the image file,
 and not of the text file, because the latter is a second reproduction, and is not strictly
 necessary to preserving the document. On the other hand, the text file enhances access
 to the work, and the purpose of preserving the work would be not only to possess it,
 but to be able to make it available to readers. Conversion of the image file to a text file
 is probably consistent with the policies underlying library copying exemptions; the
 tensions with copyright are more likely to arise over the exploitation of the text file,
 rather than over its creation.
 20. See note 17 above. In addition, sending the text from the library's files to the user's
 workstation is a "public performance" by means of transmission; see 17 U.S.C. ? 101
 (1988). Cf. On Command Video v. Columbia Pics., 777 F.Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal.
 1991) (hotel's transmission of video cassettes of motion pictures to guest rooms con-
 stituted public performance, even though no more than one guest room could access
 a particular film at any time).
 21. See L. Ray Patterson, The Nature of Copyright: A User's Guide (Athens, Ga., 1991), 218,
 discussing library access in a fair use analysis. All copyright limitations, including fair
 use, are grounded in the purpose of advancing knowledge and promoting welfare;
 Patterson, 2. Patterson, "Understanding Fair Use," Law & Contemporary Problems 29
 (1992):265 ("Fair use ceases to be viewed as taking advantage of the copyright owner
 and becomes, instead, a recognized right of the user.").
 22. Cf. House Conference Report no. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. 72-73, reprinted in
 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810, 5813-14 (under CONTU guidelines, interlibrary loan requests
 within one calendar year of more than six copies from one periodical-entire serial,
 not merely a single issue-constitute a "substitution of subscription," and exceed the
 scope of free copying under ? 108[g][2]).
 23. Herbert Howell, Howell's Copyright Law (Washington, D.C., 1942) (currently William
 Patry, Latman's The Copyright Law, 6th ed.; [Washington, D.C., 1986]).
 24. However, if an "unused replacement" is not available at a "fair price," the library may
 make a replacement copy. See 17 U.S.C. ? 108(c)(1988). On the other hand, ? 108(a)
 limits the library's reproduction to "no more than one copy."
 25. 17 U.S.C. ? 108(g)(1)(1988).
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 26. See 17 U.S.C. ? 108(g)(4) (1988). Whether libraries can "contract out of" their and
 their users' fair use privileges will be discussed below.
 27. In fact, this is already happening in the dissemination of works on CD-ROM. Pub-
 lishers are distributing these works to libraries subject to "site licenses" that exclude
 certain acts, such as interlibrary loan, or dissemination to users in sections of the uni-
 versity outside the library's normal users, as is permissible under the statutory library
 copying exemptions.
 28. In U.S. law, this kind of copying would probably be considered a fair use under 17
 U.S.C. ? 107; in many other copyright laws, this copying would be considered "pri-
 vate," and therefore exempt, or would qualify for exemption because of its brevity.
 29. See 17 U.S.C. ? 108(e) (1988).
 30. See Berne Convention, art. 9.2.
 31. See 17 U.S.C. ? 108 (f)(1) (1988).
 32. The distinction drawn here between hard copy and digital copying assumes that the
 former does not pose a threat of multiple and multigenerational copying. This dis-
 tinction may lose significance as optical scanning technology improves and comes
 within the reach of the average consumer. At that point, the user will be able quickly
 and easily to convert the hard-copy reproduction to digital format.
 33. 17 U.S.C. ? 108(g)(2) (1988).
 34. For convenience, I am defining "tomorrow's" library to include digital media to which
 the library subscribes, even though some of today's libraries already obtain many doc-
 uments in CD-ROM or online form.
 35. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (Holmes, J. concurring) (1908).
 36. Although, I may ultimately find out, if the library is making the copy and has a license
 with a collective licensing authority that requires the library to track its copying.
 37. Some libraries, such as the Library of Congress and the Bibliotheque de France, are
 national deposit libraries. Domestic copyright or other law requires deposit of copies
 of the work in the national library. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. ? 407 (1988) (Deposit to the
 Library of Congress); France, J.O. 1 July 1943, pp. 1778-79, D.C.L. Loi no. 341, 21
 June 1943.
 But deposit does not of itself entitle the library to copy the work. Having secured
 the copy by legal compulsion, the library may be able to avail itself of applicable library
 copying or fair use exemptions in copyright law to engage in limited disclosure of the
 work. Wider dissemination, however, will require permission.
 Libraries that are not national deposit institutions may have difficulty making
 acquisitions from digital publishers. Similarly, digital publishers may be reluctant to
 authorize a national library to permit access to and copying of the work to any greater
 extent than the limited amount to which it is entitled under applicable copyright laws'
 free copying privileges-as adjusted to take account of digital media.
 38. 17 U.S.C. ? 108(f)(4) (1988). As indicated earlier, libraries are in fact being asked to
 forgo some of their copying privileges in return for "site licenses" from publishers of
 digital media. One might inquire why publishers of hard-copy media did not seek to
 contract out of library copying privileges. The answer may be that, even if the thought
 of doing so had occurred, it is too difficult to control the copying of hard-copy media,
 especially when the document is available from sources other than directly from the
 publisher.
 39. Ibid.
 40. See H.R. Rep. no. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 74, reprinted at 1976
 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5687-88 (hereinafter "House Report" citing to U.S.C.C.A.N.):
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 "The doctrine of fair use applies to library photocopying, and nothing contained in
 section 108. . . is intended to take away rights existing under the fair use doctrine. To
 the contrary, section 108 authorizes certain photocopying practices which may not
 qualify as fair use."
 41. See 17 U.S.C. ? 301 (1988).
 42. Copyright protects "original works of authorship," 17 U.S.C. ? 102(a) (1988), but the
 standard of originality is very low. See, e.g, Feist Pubs. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 111 S.Ct. 1282,
 1288 (1991); Atari v. Oman, 979 F.2nd 242, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
 43. 17 U.S.C. ? 106(1) (1988). Arguably, the right sought to be enforced by contract is not
 "equivalent" because it is not freighted with the limitations that attend rights under
 copyright (section 106 makes its grant of rights "subject to sections 107 [fair use]
 through 120"). However, Congress intended to preempt state laws granting greater
 protection as well as state laws granting identical protection. See House Report, above
 note 40, at 5746: "The preemption of rights under State law is complete with respect
 to any work coming within the scope of the bill, even though the scope of exclusive
 rights given the work under the bill is narrower than the scope of common law rights
 in the work would have been."
 44. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F.Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2nd
 419 (2nd Cir. 1984). Accord, Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2nd 923, 925 (4th Cir.
 1988); Gorman, "Fact or Fancy?: The Implications for Copyright,"Journal of the Copy-
 right Society 29 (1982): 560, 605-10. See also House Report, above note 40, at 5747:
 "Nothing in this bill derogates from the rights of parties to contract with each other
 and sue for breaches of contract." This quotation taken from the House Report
 accompanying the bill that became the 1976 Copyright Act does not end the analysis,
 because the quote describes a portion of the bill that was subsequently deleted.
 45. 17 U.S.C. ? 102(b) (1988).
 46. Cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 118, 151 (1989) (holding a
 state law forbidding copying of unpatented boat hulls preempted by federal patent
 law; the Supreme Court declared that the patent laws "embody a congressional under-
 standing, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the
 rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.... The federal
 patent laws must determine what is protected, but also what is free for all to use."
 47. See Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).
 48. See Restatement of Unfair Competition ?? 40-43. Other trade secret cases involve
 acquisition of the information through other wrongful means, such as fraud or tres-
 pass. Rarely does a successful trade secret claim protect the information itself, when
 there is no conduct that is otherwise wrongful. But see ibid. ? 43, ill. 5 (flying over a
 factory and taking photographs to discover a trade secret, while not trespass, none-
 theless violates the trade secret).
 49. Cf. EC Directive, above note 17, at arts. 5.3, 6, and 9 (establishing mandatory software
 user rights to analyze and decompile the program).
 50. See generally, Wendy Gordon, "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of
 the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors," Columbia Law Review 82 (1982): 1600; Gold-
 stein, above note 6, at ?? 10.1.1-10.1.3. See also American Geophysical Union, 802
 F.Supp. 1, 24-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting fair use claim by for-profit corporation
 whose researchers photocopied from scientific journals). The American Geophysical
 court distinguished Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2nd 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd
 by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)-which had found photocopying by
 the National Institutes of Health to be fair use-on the ground that at that time, no
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 "convenient, reasonable licensing system" was available, while such licenses were avail-
 able (from the CCC) today (at 25).
 51. American Geophysical Union, 802 F.Supp. at 250.
 52. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2nd 303, 307 (2nd Cir. 1966): "The
 [fair use] practice is permitted . .. so that the world may not be deprived of improve-
 ments, or the progress of the arts retarded") (quoting Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep.
 138, 139 [K.B. 1801]). See also L. Ray Patterson, User's Guide, 102, noting that fair use
 is central to balancing author's rights in furthering goal of learning: "Access to copy-
 righted materials is necessary if that fundamental goal is to be fulfilled."
 53. See generally Pierre Leval, "Toward a Fair Use Standard," Harvard Law Review 103
 (1990): 1105, 1111-16 (stressing the claims of "transformative uses" to the fair use
 exemption).
 54. See Leon Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 24
 (rejecting application of fair use privilege to "intrinsic uses").
 55. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 n. 40 (1984) (stating
 that copying for "personal enrichment" can qualify as a fair use).
 56. An alternative is to permit the publishers to set their own rates, subject to judicial
 review for reasonableness. See InRe Turner, 1991 WL 331491 (Aug. 8, 1991 S.D.N.Y.)
 at *1 (challenge, pursuant to terms of antitrust decree governing ASCAP's activities,
 to ASCAP's rates for blanket license to cable operators).
 57. 8 Anne c. 19, sec. IV. On this provision, see generally, Harry Ransom, The First Copy-
 right Statute (Austin, Tx., 1956), 96, 101-2.
 58. See Act of 12 George 11 (1739); Ransom, First Copyright Statute, 107 n. 13. See alsoJohn
 Feather, A Dictionary of Book History (New York, 1986), 79-80 (discussing history of
 Act).
 59. 17 U.S.C. ? 101 (1988).
 60. See Feist Pubs. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 111 S.Ct. 1288, 1294 (1991).
 61. Ibid. at 1295-97.
 62. See, e.g., Key Pubs., Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enters., 945 F. 2nd 509, 512, 515-16
 (2nd Cir. 1991) (unusual listings in plaintiff's Yellow Pages of Chinese businesses met
 originality standard).
 63.- The EC Commission has proposed a Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases
 that would afford not only copyright protection to original electronic compilations,
 but a new "right to prevent unfair extraction" of nonoriginal material; COM (92) 24
 Final at arts. 2.5, 8.
 64. Or because the publisher-supplied abstract comes with permission to make this kind
 of use.
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